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Abstract
Climate security has been discussed in both academia and policy documents in the West. A key point that surfaces from
these discussions is that the cooperation of non‐military organizations is essential for effective responses to climate
change‐related threats. This overlaps considerably with debates on security in Japan, where the use of force is consti‐
tutionally restricted. Therefore, it is possible to localize the concept of climate security to the genealogy of Japan’s security
policy that, in the 1980s and 1990s, sought a non‐traditional security strategy that did not rely solely on military power
in the name of “comprehensive security,” “environmental security,” and “human security.” In Japan, the perspective of
climate security is rare. However, the introduction of a unique climate security concept into security policy enables the
maintenance of national security and environmental conservation. Additionally, struggling with climate change alongside
neighboring countries contributes to mutual confidence building and stability in international relations in Northeast Asia.
To achieve this objective, we first show that climate security includesmany kinds of security concerns by surveying previous
studies and comparing Western countries’ climate security policies. Second, we follow the evolution of Japan’s security
policy from 1980 to 2021. Finally, we review Japanese climate security policies and propose policy options.
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1. Introduction
Climate security is an urgent concern in policymaking
and research in the West. A key point that surfaces from
the discussions is that the cooperation of non‐military
organizations is essential for military organizations to
respond effectively to climate change‐related threats.
Climate security, which emphasizes non‐military means,
is beneficial to Japan, where the use of force is constitu‐
tionally restricted, but climate security is not yet an over‐
arching concern (Kameyama & Ono, 2021).
The term “climate security” refers to a line of
thought that climate change impacts raise various secu‐
rity threats. Its signature is that these threats are linked
to all areas of politics, the economy, and society and
could result in violent conflict. However, the meanings
of climate security are diverse andmultifaceted, as many
national and international actors have used this term in
their own contexts. Many studies have tried to catego‐
rize them to cover the wide range of discourse (Baysal
& Karakaş, 2017; Hasui, 2011; Kameyama & Ono, 2021;
Kanie, 2007; McDonald, 2013).
To localize the concept of climate security to Japan,
we contextualize it within Japanese climate and secu‐
rity policy. We then examine Japanese policymak‐
ing since the 1980s and 1990s to investigate a non‐
traditional security strategy that does not solely rely
on military power in the name of “comprehensive
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security,’’ “environmental security,” and “human secu‐
rity.” The introduction of a unique climate security con‐
cept into Japanese security policy enables both national
security and environmental conservation. Further,
regional cooperation on climate change improves inter‐
national relations.
To this end, we first show that climate security
includes many kinds of security by surveying previous
studies and comparing the climate security policies of
Western countries. Second, we follow the evolution of
Japanese climate and security policy from 1980 to 2021.
Finally, we review Japanese climate security policies and
propose policy options.
2. Research and Policy Trends on Climate Security
2.1. Research Trends
Research on climate change and security has become
prominent. This trend can be found in statistical research
on “climate change and peace.” Sharifi et al. (2020)
confirm that articles on climate change and negative
peace—that is, the absence of physical violence—on the
Web of Science have surged since 2007 and 2015, when
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
Fourth Assessment Report was first published and the
Sustainable Development Goals were adopted by United
Nations Member States, respectively. According to the
study, the treatises can be divided into four clusters:
institutional mechanisms; violent conflict in Africa and
the disaster‐conflict nexus; migration and adaptation;
and resource management and environmental security.
The most predominant themes are “war (civil war),” fol‐
lowed by “immigration and conflict” and “risk.”
Climate change poses a security threat because it
can threaten human security and increase the risk of vio‐
lent conflict. The logic is that climate change undermines
human security by reducing access to and the quality of
natural resources that are important for sustaining liveli‐
hoods. Climate change can also erode the very ability of
states to provide opportunities and services to people
for their livelihoods. Thus, the direct and indirect effects
of climate change on human security have the potential
to increase the risk of violent conflict (Barnett & Adger,
2007). Climate change’s status as a security issue is con‐
troversial, especially if rising temperatures lead to mili‐
tary conflict. To verify that logic, empirical studies have
analyzed the relationship between climate change and
the occurrence of violence, resulting in mixed findings.
Among skeptical authors, Gartzke (2012) analyzes
the correlation between rising temperatures and the fre‐
quency of interstate conflicts since 1800, finding, instead,
a fall in conflicts. Buhaug’s (2010) study of various violent
conflicts in Africa finds that climate change is an inade‐
quate predictor of armed conflict, as it examines the rela‐
tionship between drought fever and civil war. He states
that civil war in Africa can be explained by general struc‐
tural and contextual conditions such as ethno‐political
exclusion, poor national economies, and the collapse of
the Cold War system. Another study has shown that pre‐
cipitation deviations are not important and that politi‐
cal, economic, and geographic factors outweigh extreme
weather in terms of the location and timing of vio‐
lence events (O’Loughlin et al., 2014). Gleditsch (2012)
argues that few studies have demonstrated a causal link
between climate change and conflict and criticizes the
recognition of climate change as a security issue, call‐
ing it a self‐fulfilling prophecy that might lead to a mili‐
tary response.
By contrast, research supporting the link between
climate change and conflict shows that temperatures
much higher than normal increase the risk of violence
(O’Loughlin et al., 2012). Hendrix and Salehyan (2012)
highlight that variability in rainfall affects political con‐
flicts and increases the possibility of violence in rainy
years. A study of the relationships between climate
change, food prices, and violence shows that unusu‐
ally dry conditions are associated with an increasing fre‐
quency of conflict and that reduced precipitation has
an indirect effect on conflict through its impact on food
prices (Raleigh et al., 2015).
Research on climate security is not only empirical
research but also discourse analysis. Critical security the‐
ory argues that security policy is not only based on objec‐
tive facts but also relies on public opinion and the per‐
ceptions of policymakers and stakeholders. Proof of the
causal relationship through data, experimentation, and
policy discourse is important, necessitating a social con‐
structionist approach.
McDonald (2013) argues that climate security dis‐
course can be divided into national, human, interna‐
tional, and ecosystem security. He argues that ecolog‐
ical security is more effective in responding to climate
change than climate security. Hayes and Knox‐Hayes
(2014) conducted a discourse analysis of securitization
concerning climate change. They reveal the factors that
cause policy differences between the EU and US. While
the US emphasizes national security threats in climate
security policy, Europe prioritizes economic benefits and
a new world order. The authors note that the legiti‐
macy of climate security policy has increased because
of the response of traditional security actors to cli‐
mate change. Ferguson (2019) classifies climate secu‐
rity resilience into four categories: strategic, neoliberal,
social, and ecological. As actors who securitize each
resilience, strategic resilience includes military organi‐
zations and thinktanks; neoliberal resilience comprises
international organizations; social resilience includes cit‐
izens, non‐governmental organizations, and researchers;
and ecological resilience includes citizen researchers and
the IPCC.
In addition, thinktanks have advocated climate secu‐
rity policies. The Center for Climate and Security
recommended that the Japanese government man‐
age comprehensive climate security risks, noting the
unpreparedness to climate threats of the Japanese
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economy (Conger et al., 2019; Fetzek et al., 2019).
Similarly, the Climate Security Expert Network judges the
strength of climate security in Europe to be varied, rec‐
ommending the appointment of a senior adviser/special
envoy on climate security to the cabinet of the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, also known as the EU foreign minister
(Brown et al., 2020).
Today, the actors and fields involved have expanded
and diversified because of how climate change has
evolved from an environmental issue to a security issue.
Indeed, climate security now involves more diversified
authority and complex governance.
2.2. Climate Security Policies in the West
How do Western countries recognize the threat of cli‐
mate change? In this section, we investigate this recog‐
nition in terms of climate change mitigation and climate
security using national reports. The BidenAdministration
has recommitted the US to the Paris Agreement.
In January 2021, Biden issued an executive order stat‐
ing that the climate crisis is central to US foreign policy
and national security (The White House, 2021a). At the
Leaders Summit on Climate in April, the US set a course
for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 50–52% of
2005 levels by 2030 and achieving net zero emissions for
the entire economy by 2050 at the latest. In addition,
the US expressed its commitment to create jobs, pro‐
mote innovation, and achieve environmental justice by
promoting climate change measures (The White House,
2021b). The US Department of Defense (DoD) considers
climate change a threat to national security and highly
recommends that the US military improve its capaci‐
ties to adapt. A 2015 Pentagon report recognizes that
climate change poses an immediate, existential threat.
The report especially notes the interactions between
conflict dynamics and climate change and states that,
in 20 years, most military installations will be vulnera‐
ble to the effects of flood, drought, desertification, wild‐
fire, and thawing permafrost (US Department of Defense
[DoD], 2015, 2019). The DoD’s latest report assesses
exposure to climate hazards due to rising tempera‐
tures during the century. According to this report, haz‐
ards directly related to temperature changes (e.g., heat,
droughts, wildfires) have significantly higher exposure
than other hazards (e.g., coastal floods, energy demand,
land degradation). Drought is a particularly dominant
hazard not only in the continental US but also around the
world (DoD, 2021).
In 2019, the UK became the first major country to
legislate a target of net zero greenhouse gases by 2050
(Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy
& The Rt Hon Chris Skidmore MP, 2019). In December
2020, Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced a new
plan that aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by
at least 68% of 1990 levels by the end of the decade. He
also stated that this would create and support 250,000
jobs (Department for Business, Energy & Industrial
Strategy et al., 2020). The British Ministry of Defense
acknowledges that if the environment deteriorates,
perhaps through extreme weather, community migra‐
tion and social instability are inevitable. Acknowledging
that climate change will affect agriculture, urban areas,
the economy, and transportation, it highlights that
the climate‐induced disruption of water supplies and
impact on agriculture could be used to push individu‐
als to join terrorist or dissident groups (UK Ministry of
Defence, 2018).
In 2016, Canada developed the Pan‐Canadian
Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change as
its first national climate plan, and it released A Healthy
Environment and a Healthy Economy, Canada’s strength‐
ened climate plan, in December 2020. The plan aims
to reduce pollution, create jobs, and support a healthy
economy and environment and is a building block for
achieving net zero emissions by 2050 (Government of
Canada, 2021). The department of National Defence
in Canada recognizes that climate change is compli‐
cating the global security environment. Canada, for
example, points out that melting ice in the Arctic will
increase security needs. The report also states that cli‐
mate change affects the frequency, duration, and inten‐
sity of meteorological disasters such as floods, wildfires,
and droughts; hence, Canadian defense should be able to
respond quickly to disasters and contribute to search and
rescue operations (Canadian Department of National
Defence, 2020).
In 2015, Australia set a goal of reducing its green‐
house gas emissions by 26–28% of 2005 levels by
2030. Since 2020, the responsibility for domestic cli‐
mate policy and emission reduction has been transferred
to the new Department of Industry, Science, Energy
and Resources, while climate change adaptation strate‐
gies and climate science activities have been trans‐
ferred to the Department of Agriculture, Water and
the Environment (Australian Government’s Department
of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources, 2021).
The Australian Department of Defence also sees climate
change as a key challenge for the next 20 years. Rising sea
levels and extreme weather will put pressure on defense
activities and natural assets not only of Australia but also
of neighboring countries along with such existing chal‐
lenges as population growth and environmental destruc‐
tion. Australia therefore states that it will remain a leader
in responding to regional demands for humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief (Australian Department of
Defence, 2016).
New Zealand has stated that it will address climate
change through leadership, productivity, sustainability,
a climate resilient economy, and a just and inclusive
society at home and abroad. By doing so, it aims to
become a global leader in combating climate change.
In November 2019, the Climate Change Response (Zero
Carbon) Amendment Act 2019 legislated new domestic
emission reduction targets through 2050. The legislation
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 4, Pages 79–90 81
stipulates that net emissions of all greenhouse gases
should be reduced to zero by 2050 (New Zealand’s
Ministry for the Environment, 2021). A New Zealand
Ministry of Defence report claims that climate change
will be one of the greatest security challenges in the com‐
ing decades and that Pacific Island nations will be dis‐
proportionally affected by global warming: “intensifying
impacts of climate change will continue to test commu‐
nity resilience and heighten security challenges across
the culturally diverse Pacific region” (New Zealand’s
Ministry of Defence, 2018, p. 3). The perception is
that climate change threatens both individual countries
and entire regions, portending cultural loss. The report
shows that climate change is linked to security and
that weak governance exacerbates this negative influ‐
ence. Conventional security overlaps and extends human
and environmental security. Additionally, climate change
policies operate onmultiple levels of governance: nation‐
ally, regionally, and globally (New Zealand’s Ministry
of Defence, 2018). New Zealand also follows the pro‐
gressive view that international cooperation on climate
change measures further strengthens national defense.
Research andnational documents on climate security
have shown that the perception is common that climate
change poses a variety of threats. Furthermore, respond‐
ing to climate change requires activities by various
actors andmultidimensional governance. However, such
perceptions of climate security have not yet become
common in Japan. Therefore, in the next section, we
investigate the cause by following the transition of
Japan’s security and climate change policy.
3. Japan’s Climate and Security Policy Transition
3.1. Comprehensive Security: 1980s
The tone of Japan’s security situation in the 1980s
involved the escalation of the East–West confronta‐
tion after the Pax Americana and New Cold War era.
The Japanese defense relied on the Japan–US Security
Treaty because the Japanese Self‐Defense Forces (JSDF)
have been constitutionally restricted and taken as force
used for “defensive defense.” The Masayoshi Ohira cabi‐
net saw comprehensive security as a means for expand‐
ing the concept of security in Japan.
The most structured arrangement of this security
concept is the report of Prime Minister Ohira’s policy
study group. Based on the recognition that Japan had
entered the “era of global society,” this report viewed
security issues as having a comprehensive character and
defined security as “protecting people’s lives from vari‐
ous threats” (Cabinet Secretariat, 1980, p. 8). The group
divided the government’s security efforts into three
levels: (a) managing threats domestically, (b) making
the international environment partially favorable in sol‐
idarity with likeminded countries, and (c) making the
international environment holistically favorable to elim‐
inate the threat. While discussing traditional military
security issues such as Japan–US relations, strengthen‐
ing self‐defense, and China–Soviet Union relations, this
study group also established the groundwork for eco‐
nomic security (e.g., energy and food) and introduced
non‐military threats (e.g., large‐scale earthquakes) into
the ambit of the Japanese security concept.
The 1980s was marked by emerging concerns about
climate change. The 1985 meeting in Villach, hosted by
the UN Environment Programme and others, appealed
to the international community to tackle global warm‐
ing for the first time. In Japan, the World Conference
on the Changing Atmosphere in Toronto triggered the
establishment of the Study Team on Global Warming
Issues at the Air Quality Bureau of the Environment
Agency in May 1988, and policy studies officially com‐
menced. The first IPCC meeting in November 1988
was attended by 11 representatives from Japan, includ‐
ing the Environment Agency, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries, the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry, and theMeteorological Agency (Environmental
Agency Global Warming Problem Study Group, 1990).
Accordingly, a forum for international and domestic dis‐
cussions on climate change rapidly prevailed in the sec‐
ond half of the 1980s.
3.2. Human and Environmental Security: 1990s
After the Cold War, the threat of the Soviet Union
diminished for Japan. Thereafter, the JSDF intensified
its active operations, including dispatching the Maritime
Self‐Defense Force to the Persian Gulf after the 1991Gulf
War and participating in UN peacekeeping operations.
Although the Japanese government maintained the JSDF
as a “basic defense force” during peacetime, as advo‐
cated in the first National Defense Program Guideline
(NDPG; Defense Agency, 1976, Chapter 2, Section 4), the
new 1995 NDPG based on the post‐Cold War era stated
that “we will develop defense capabilities that can effec‐
tively respond to various situations, and… ensure appro‐
priate elasticity…[to] respond smoothly to changes in sit‐
uations” (Defense Agency, 1996, Chapter 2, Section 4).
The redefinition of the Japan–US alliance led concur‐
rently to the Japan–US Joint Declaration on Security
(1996) andGuidelines for Japan–USDefense Cooperation
(1997). This further solidified the Japan–US alliance.
Subsequently, the military threat from China and North
Korea escalated and the influence of the traditional mili‐
tary view on national security increased.
The House of Councilors Study Group on Foreign
Affairs and Comprehensive Security (1992) compiled a
report titled The Role of Japan in the 1990s—Concept
of Environment and Security. It incorporated global envi‐
ronmental issues into comprehensive security to build
an environmental security theory. The report covered
a broad range of topics from pursuing environmen‐
tal security to peaceful world order in the new era.
It included important ideas that were later realized
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as policies, including establishing the Ministry of the
Environment (MOE), revitalizing forests, improving food
security, and promoting environmental official develop‐
ment assistance and climate science.
While discussions on environmental security
emerged in Japan’s political arena, for the post‐Cold
War international community, where developing coun‐
tries faced newer, non‐military existential crises, the
UN Development Programme (UNDP) established
human development and human security as policy agen‐
das with the Human Development Reports of 1993 and
1994. In a subsequent report, it argued that the “concept
of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly”
and called for expansion (UN Development Programme
[UNDP], 1994, p. 22). The UNDP’s new concept of
human security included economic, food, health, envi‐
ronmental, personal, community, and political security
(UNDP, 1994). The World Commission on Environment
and Development’s report Our Common Future also
mentioned environmental and climate security (World
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987).
Western countries also discussed these concepts
(Dabelko & Simmons, 1997; Dalby, 1992; Homer‐Dixon,
1994, 1999). This movement later formed the basis of
climate security theory.
Instead of the environmental security concept, which
was not so widely known at that time, Japan incor‐
porated human security, which included environmental
security as a component, into its foreign policy under
Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi (later prime minister)
in response to the 1998 Asian financial crisis (Kurusu,
2011). The Japanese government actively engaged in
human security diplomacy, including the establishment
of the Commission on Human Security, cochaired by
Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, at the 2000 Millennium
Summit. The report stressed “protection” and “empow‐
erment” by states and other actors (Commission on
Human Security, 2003). Japan recognized human secu‐
rity as non‐military security concept and chose as foreign
policy to emphasize freedom fromwant. This movement
accorded with a Japanese tradition that places greater
importance on non‐military security in the context of,
for example, earthquakes or the environment. Japan uti‐
lized this concept as official development assistance poli‐
cies for developing countries to make the international
environment holistically favorable, as shown in the com‐
prehensive security policy in the 1980s. This choice is dif‐
ferent from that of Canada, which developed a foreign
policy centered on freedom from fear, focusing on peace‐
keeping operations and actively participating in opera‐
tions on the Balkan Peninsula. Such conceptual flexibil‐
ity is key to human security (Huliaras & Tzifakis, 2007),
allowing it to be localized and incorporated into govern‐
ment policy.
In climate politics in Japan, the Global Environment
Department was established at the Environment Agency
and the Global Warming Prevention Action Plan was
announced in 1990. Thus, the Japanese government’s cli‐
mate change countermeasures were in the implementa‐
tion stage. However, from the establishment of Japan’s
Environment Agency in 1971 to the enactment of the
Basic Environment Law in 1993, more than 20 years
elapsed before environmental policies were integrated
into the national legal system. At the time, Japanese
environmental diplomacy achieved spectacular results,
such as the establishment of and contribution to the
UN Environment Programme and negotiations at the
IPCC and UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Until the early 1990s, Japan’s climate change diplomacy
had only a fragile institutional base. However, at the
third Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change in 1997, the then largest
international conference ever held in Japan, the Kyoto
Protocol was successfully adopted despite internal fric‐
tions between the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry and Environment Agency (Takeuchi, 1998).
3.3. Emergency Legislation and Climate Security: 2000s
The North Korean launch of Taepodong in August 1998
impressed upon the Japanese people the enormous
threat to their military security. The Obuchi cabinet,
which adopted human security as a foreign policy, also
passed an act to strengthen its military alliance with the
US and, at the end of 2003, the JSDF were dispatched
to Iraq. The NDPG was revised in 2004 when the govern‐
ment pursued security at three levels, namely, Japan’s
own efforts, the Japan–US alliance, and cooperationwith
the international community, along the same line as com‐
prehensive security in the 1980s. Although the Japanese
government stated that “the possibility of full‐scale
aggression against Japan is decreasing” (Defense Agency,
2004), the government aimed to expand the JSDF’s capa‐
bilities and range of activities on the grounds of the
high degree of uncertainty and unpredictability of secu‐
rity situations. In 2007, the Defense Agency became the
Ministry of Defense (MOD), when the position of the
JSDF’s overseas activities changed from secondary to pri‐
mary missions. The JSDF were deployed to Nepal, Sudan,
and the waters off Somalia.
In 2001, Japanese Environment Agency was reorga‐
nized and became the MOE. In climate diplomacy, the
Kyoto Protocol came into effect in 2005. Since that year,
climate change has begun to be discussed seriously in
the global political arena in relation to security. British
Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, stressed climate
security in a remark she made at the 2005 Gleneagles
Group of Eight Summit. She emphasized the need for cli‐
mate security at the 2006 UN General Assembly as well
(UN General Assembly, 2006). This was beginning of the
international climate security debate.
The MOE moved swiftly to incorporate the climate
security concept into its policy agenda. Discussions
among policymakers began in February 2007 under
the Sub‐Committee on International Climate Change
Strategy Global Environment Committee, Central
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Environment Council. Although the committee specified
that the need for the concept had been recognized in
Japan after October 2006, mentions of climate security
were raised on consecutive occasions.
The possibility of the policy implementation of the
climate security concept was discussed three times
by the committee and resulted in the 2007 Climate
Security Report (Ministry of the Environment [MOE],
2007). It defined climate security as focusing on the
“fundamental elements of security—that is, who must
act to protect what values from what threats, and in
what manner” (MOE, 2007, p. 17). Nations must act
to protect the safety and welfare of citizens from the
broad threats of climate change caused by emissions of
greenhouse gases in each nation’s mitigation and adap‐
tation measures and international cooperation (MOE,
2007). The report highlights that the concept of climate
security in Japan was created through (a) international
debates on climate security, (b) accelerating climate
change, (c) the evolution of the concept of security, and
(d) the concept of comprehensive security. The report
also recommends the need to respond to climate change
as a security issue and highlights the advantages of
the climate security concept. Finally, it finalizes climate
security policies based on comprehensive security and
the contribution to human security as well as Japan’s
role with respect to climate security to promote build‐
ing a low‐carbon society and reducing greenhouse gases
through international negotiation. The report indicates
that climate change should be given central attention
since it influences other security concerns. The report
recommends incorporating climate security into national
and international policies. However, it does not specify
the positions or methods for national or foreign policies
(Hasui, 2011).
Why is climate security struggling to become amajor
political issue in Japan? From an academic perspective,
one reason is the difference in attitude toward envi‐
ronmental security studies between Japan and Western
countries. The relationship between climate change and
security has been disputed within environmental secu‐
rity studies since the 1990s and positive research pub‐
lished in the US and Europe since the 2000s. However,
Japanese scholars tend to maintain a cautious position
(Ochiai, 2001; Ohta, 2002; Yamada, 1999).
From a political perspective, one of the biggest obsta‐
cles is the absence of dynamism between political par‐
ties. Since World War II, the pro‐US conservative Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) has often been in power. Due to
this absence, Japan has almost no synergistic effect
between political parties like the West. In 2009, the
center‐left Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took power
from the LDP for the first time. The Yukio Hatoyama cab‐
inet of the DPJ aimed to reduce greenhouse gases by
25% from 1990 levels by 2020, so climate change miti‐
gation policies were also expected to progress. However,
Hatoyama resigned owing to unrelated domestic issues
in the next year, and the DPJ suffered some confusion
in policymaking. Climate security policies were no excep‐
tion, and they stalled despite a regime change.
3.4. National Security and Proactive Strategies: 2010s
In March 2010, the DPJ submitted a bill named the Basic
Law of Global Warming Countermeasures. However, it
did not refer to climate security discourse. On the con‐
trary, the LDP, as the opposition party at that time, sub‐
mitted a bill named the Basic Law of Promoting Building
a Low‐Carbon Society. The bill stated that “global warm‐
ing is a security issue that destabilizes the continuing
existence of humankind and its prevention is a problem
common to all humankind” (House of Representatives,
2010a). Another opposition party, Komeito, submitted
another bill named the Basic Law of the Promotion of
Climate Change Countermeasures. In its preamble, the
bill stated that “climate change is recognized as a threat
that destabilizes human existence. From this viewpoint
of climate security, under international cooperation, the
mitigation and adaptation of climate change is one of the
biggest issues of humankind” (House of Representatives,
2010b). Thus, debate on climate change and security
heated up in the JapaneseDiet. However, the bills did not
pass during the sessions in the Diet and were scrapped.
Around the same time, bills on climate security were
submitted to Congress in the US, but they toowere aban‐
doned. These were the Climate Security Act of 2007,
known as the Lieberman‐Warner bill, and the American
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, known as the
Waxman‐Markey bill. Both insisted that climate change
posed serious security threats to humanity. However, as
a result of the intentions of the business community
and political dynamics of Congress and the Diet, nei‐
ther Japan nor the US passed a law that embodies cli‐
mate security.
In March 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake
forced all nuclear power plants in Japan to shut down.
According to an ex‐MOFA bureaucrat, Takehiro Kano, the
Great Earthquake made it clear that a major review of
nuclear energy policywas required. Nuclear power policy
and Japan’s climate change countermeasures, which had
been two sides of the same coin, becamedifficult toman‐
age. It also became difficult to allocate human resources
to climate change policy owing to the earthquake dis‐
aster and nuclear accident, which subsequently influ‐
enced climate change negotiations (Kano, 2013). Nuclear
power accounted for 11.3% of Japan’s primary energy
supply in 2010 (Agency for Natural Resources and Energy,
2012); it was unclearwhether this could be compensated
for by energy saving or renewable energy, preventing car‐
bon emission increases (Kano, 2013). As a result, Japan
did not participate in the extended Kyoto Protocol.
In 2012, the LDP regained power and Komeito joined
as a coalition party. The cabinet of Shinzo Abe, which
emphasized the Japan–US alliance and military capabil‐
ity, established the National Security Council (NSC) mod‐
eled on theUS’ NSC and formulated theNational Security
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Strategy for the first time in Japan in 2013. In this docu‐
ment, the section “Challenges to Human Security” insists
that “Japan needs to promote necessarymeasures based
on the principle of human security” (National Security
Council [NSC], 2013, p. 10). The “Global Economy and
Its Risk” section refers to “the aggravating environmental
problems arising from climate change,” which entail the
risk of “crunches in global supply and demand as well as
temporary shortages of supply in food and water” (NSC,
2013, p. 11).
In December 2017, Japan held the meeting of the
UN Security Council (UNSC) with 42 non‐member states
to discuss the maintenance of international peace and
security. In this meeting, Secretary General António
Guterres stated that “climate change has emerged as
a threat multiplier” (UN Security Council [UNSC], 2017,
p. 2). The representative of Japan, Koro Bessho, pointed
out “the rise in complex contemporary challenges to
international peace and security” (UNSC, 2017, p. 3).
He stated the need to adopt a more comprehensive
and integrated approach, enhance cooperation with
other organs within and outside the United Nations,
and reform the UN. Many states, including Japan itself,
stressed the importance of the security threat of cli‐
mate change. This was a major achievement of the
Abe administration. Despite limited Japanese academic
research, this is a notable piece of recent Japanese cli‐
mate diplomacy.
These political movements indicate that in the 2010s,
the Abe administration attempted to rebalance Japan’s
security policy toward a more traditional military policy.
However, Abe maintained some aspects of comprehen‐
sive security until the end of his administration.
3.5. Current Countermeasures on Climate Change
and Security
This section examines the trend in policy documents
over the last few years. Despite the debate in the UNSC
in 2017, the Japanese government recognizes climate
change as an economic rather than a security issue.
At the Leaders Summit on Climate in April 2021, the
Japanese prime minister, Suga, stated that:
[Our effort to address climate change]will be the driv‐
ing force of the long‐termdynamic growth of not only
Japan’s economy, but also the global economy. With
this vision inmind, in the fall of last year, immediately
after assuming the office of PrimeMinister, I declared
that Japan will aim for net‐zero by 2050. (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs [MOFA], 2021, p. 1)
His statement shows that the Japanese government is
planning to link the realization of a carbon‐free society to
economic growth. However, there is no vision for struc‐
turing regional order, such as cooperation with neigh‐
boring countries through climate security andmulti‐level
governance, as advocated in New Zealand.
On the contrary, the MOE’s highest priority is cli‐
mate change. It is predicted that the risk of meteoro‐
logical disasters will increase because of global warming,
and therefore, the current problem is shifting to a cli‐
mate crisis. In response to such risks, the MOE is imple‐
menting policies aimed at social change for disaster pre‐
vention. It is also seeking to support developing coun‐
tries, especially through the Asia‐Pacific Climate Change
Adaptation Information Platform (MOE, 2020a).
The MOD, whose primary mission is military secu‐
rity, has not yet substantially addressed climate change
countermeasures. The JSDF also seek to shift to renew‐
able energy to the extent possible. Unrelated to cli‐
mate change, the JSDF propose activities to manage
disaster relief, including lifesaving, emergency recovery,
and life support. Internationally, the MOD is working to
strengthen humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
(HA/DR) cooperation, however, primarily with South
Asian and ASEAN countries. In fact, two C‐130Hs were
dispatched as international emergency relief in response
to the recent fires in Australia (Ministry of Defense
[MOD], 2020).
Thus, although Japan’s climate change policies are
diverse, they are neither based on nor integrated into the
idea of climate security. However, political interest in cli‐
mate security has begun to emerge. The 2020 Climate
Change Impact Assessment Report (Review) states that
“climate security is a relatively new perspective, and
although the number of studies and surveys is limited,
it is also very important for taking international climate
change countermeasures, and it is necessary to enhance
knowledge of it” (MOE, 2020b, p. 70). In addition, new
movement can be seen in 2021. In the Leaders Summit
on Climate, the minister of defense defined climate
change as a “linkage risk,” remarking that it creates a
harsh environment, destabilizes societies, and becomes
a source of conflict that causes further environmental
degradation (MOD, 2021).
4. Conclusion
We summarize the implications from the research trends
and policy documents on climate security as follows.
The concept of climate security recognizes the following
basic course of events. Extreme weather events caused
by climate change lead to economic and social instabil‐
ity and violent conflict, while political conflicts and cli‐
mate disasters are likely to produce refugees, resource
depletion, and economic stagnation, involving the need
for complex responses. Therefore, when dealing with
climate‐related conflicts and post‐conflict peacebuilding,
the influence of climate change should be accounted for.
Concerns about climate security are so diverse that
climate security cannot be grasped within the frame‐
work of conventional resource management aiming to
secure water, food, energy, or “traditional security,” rely‐
ing heavily on military power. It needs close coopera‐
tion between military and non‐military organizations for
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a holistic response to climate security issues. For exam‐
ple, the military, an organization that can operate
in harsh environments, responds to HA/DR and vio‐
lent conflict, whereas international organizations and
non‐governmental organizations respond to economic
and social issues. Together, they canmitigate the impacts
of climate change, thereby allowing the affected coun‐
tries to adapt. Furthermore, the effects of climate change
transcend national borders; international cooperation is
essential for climate security policies. We confirm that
improving governance capacity is important for the real‐
ization of adaptation policies that reduce the disasters
caused by climate change.
These characteristics of climate security considerably
overlap with the transition of Japan’s security policy.
Comprehensive security presented a framework inwhich
not only military but also non‐military threats should
be considered as security issues. Human security has
become an international norm, shifting the subject of
security from nation to human. Regarding climate secu‐
rity, the momentum for policymaking increased within
the MOE around 2007 when the report was published.
A bill was also submitted by the DPJ, the LDP, and
Komeito. However, the Great East Japan Earthquake and
two changes of government forced the government to
alter its climate policy, which relies on the operation
of nuclear power plants. After that, the Abe administra‐
tion, emphasizing economic growth and a return to tradi‐
tional security policies, achieved the longest administra‐
tion. These factors failed to turn climate security into a
concrete policy. Figure 1 shows the transition of Japan’s
climate and security policy. Since the 1980s, various secu‐
rity concepts have accumulated as layers rather than
discontinuous polices. Climate security stagnated in the
2010s but could once again become central to Japan’s
security after the 2020s.
Finally, we present some recommendations to the
Japanese government based on the above findings.
To catch up with the world trends of climate secu‐
rity, Japan should position climate security as a core
strategy. Although the possibility that climate change
may have a security impact is mentioned in the NDPG
(Security Council and Cabinet, 2010, p. 3), the National
Security Strategy only mentions “climate change and
other environmental issues” along with social inequal‐
ity and infectious diseases under “human security” in
Section III‐1–(5). On the contrary, “ensuring maritime
security” is listed in IV‐1–(4). We thus recommend that
climate security be listed at the same or higher level than
human or maritime security. To create an organization
taskedwith themanagement of climate security issues in
an integrated manner, the MOE should also participate
in the NSC.
For effective and common policies on climate secu‐
rity, it is essential to cooperate with neighboring coun‐
tries. If cooperating countries are actively concerned
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Figure 1. Transition of Japan’s climate and security policies.
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about climate change issues as security problems, this
could contribute to the formation of a new interna‐
tional/regional order. If the Japanese government can
play a leading role, as it did in the UN open debate in
2017, this will build trust at the global level. However,
although efforts toward self‐help and a favorable interna‐
tional environment are strongly stated in current climate
change policy, endeavors in East Asia are weak. To over‐
come this weakness, it is necessary to have an organi‐
zation/institution with a bird’s‐eye view of the risks to
security caused by climate change in East Asia and Japan.
The Japanese government has launched the Asia‐Pacific
Climate Change Adaptation Information Platform and
upholds the basic measures, namely, “securing a system
for collecting, organizing, analyzing, and providing infor‐
mation” (MOE, 2018, p. 9). If actively reinforced, these
measures will contribute greatly to cooperation by stan‐
dardizing policy. For this purpose, domestic policy and
foreign aid linked to the improvement of governance are
also required, as shown in Basic Strategy 4 and 6 of the
Climate Change Adaptation Plan (MOE, 2018).
The JSDF should have operations based on climate
security. This works in a similar fashion to rescue opera‐
tions for typhoons, heavy rain, and peacekeeping oper‐
ations. These experiences may yield good practices.
However, the JSDF have little experience of collabo‐
rating with other institutions, and larger institutional
issues exist. According to Basic Strategy 1 of the Climate
Change Adaptation Plan, the connection between secu‐
rity and climate change policies should not be hin‐
dered. However, Japan does not yet have an organi‐
zation that integrates all policies to monitor, identify,
and respond to these issues. Emphasis on climate secu‐
rity leads to the recognition that existing conflict deter‐
rence measures alone are inadequate and costly. If so,
Japan would prefer addressing climate change as con‐
flict prevention.
While Japan’s military security policy has been based
on the Japan–US alliance, the country previously tried
to establish non‐military security policies. In light of the
climate crisis, it is important to discuss climate secu‐
rity within the scope of the MOE alongside international
discourse. This argument may make it appropriate to
graft climate security to Japan’s New Comprehensive
Security policy. Along the lines of the Comprehensive
Security effort, introducing the concept of climate secu‐
rity into Japan’s non‐military security policy can pro‐
mote the security of the Japanese people and conser‐
vation of territory as management threats domestically
(self‐help). Further, common climate security policies
among neighboring countries will build confidence and
improve regional stability, thus making the international
environment partially favorable in solidarity with like‐
minded countries. Lastly, with the pillar of human secu‐
rity, climate security will build another pillar of Japanese
diplomacy in the UN and other multilateral arenas, such
as the Leaders Summit on Climate. This would make the
international environment holistically favorable to elim‐
inating the threat. To this end, Japan must conduct cli‐
mate diplomacymotivated by the security of each nation.
The remaining academic challenge is to analyze the simi‐
larities and differences between the climate security poli‐
cies of neighboring countries and Japan. Revealing the
similarities and differences would help make as many
nations as possible understand the concept and ben‐
efits of climate security and standardize climate secu‐
rity policies.
Acknowledgments
This research was performed by the Environment
Research and Technology Development Fund
(JPMEERF20182001) of the Environmental Restoration
and Conservation Agency of Japan.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
References
Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. (2012). Ene‐
guri hakusho [Energy white paper]. https://www.
enecho.meti.go.jp/about/whitepaper/2012pdf/
index.html
Australian Department of Defence. (2016). Environ‐
mental strategy 2016–2036. https://www.defence.
gov.au/estatemanagement/governance/policy/
environment/Policy/EnvironmentStrategy2016.PDF
Australian Government’s Department of Industry, Sci‐
ence, Energy and Resources. (2021). Australia’s
climate change strategies. https://www.industry.gov.
au/policies‐and‐initiatives/australias‐climate‐
change‐strategies
Barnett, J., & Adger, W. N. (2007). Climate change,
human security and violent conflict. Political Geogra‐
phy, 26, 639–655.
Baysal, B., & Karakaş, U. (2017). Climate change and
security: Different perceptions, different approaches.
Uluslararası İlişkiler, 14(54), 21–44.
Brown, O., More, A. L., & Raasteen, J. (2020). Europe and
climate security: Is Europe delivering on its rhetoric?
The Climate Security Expert Network.
Buhaug, H. (2010). Climate not to blame for African
civil wars. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America, 107(38),
16477–16482.
Cabinet Secretariat. (1980). Sogo anzenhosho senryaku—
Ohira sori no seisaku kenkyukai hokokusho 5 [Com‐
prehensive security strategy—Prime minister Ohira’s
policy study group report 5]. Printing Bureau, Min‐
istry of Finance.
Canadian Department of National Defence. (2020).
Defence energy and environment strategy: Har‐
nessing energy efficiency and sustainability—
Defence and the road to the future, 2020–2023.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 4, Pages 79–90 87
https://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.890715/
publication.html
Commission on Human Security. (2003). Human security
now. Communications Development Incorporated.
Conger, J., Fetzek, S., & Fleishman, R. (2019). Climate
change lessons from the US military: What Japanese
industry can learn from another global enterprise
(Japan Series Report 2). The Center for the Climate
and Security.
Dabelko, G., & Simmons, G. (1997). Environment and
security: Core ideas and US government initiatives.
SAIS Review, 17(1), 127–146.
Dalby, S. (1992). Security, modernity, ecology: The dilem‐
mas of post‐Cold War security discourse. Alterna‐
tives: Global, Local, Political, 17(1), 95–134.
Defense Agency. (1976). Boei hakusho [Defense white
paper]. Printing Bureau, Ministry of Finance.
Defense Agency. (1996). Boei hakusho [Defense white
paper]. Printing Bureau, Ministry of Finance.
Defense Agency. (2004). Boei hakusho [Defense white
paper]. http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_
data/2004/2004/index.html
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy,
& The Rt Hon Chris Skidmore MP. (2019, June 27).
UK becomes first major economy to pass net zero
emissions law. GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/
government/news/uk‐becomes‐first‐major‐
economy‐to‐pass‐net‐zero‐emissions‐law
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy,
Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, The Rt
Hon Alok Sharma MP, & The Rt Hon Boris Johnson
MP. (2020, December 3). UK sets ambitious new
climate target ahead of UN summit [Press release].
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk‐sets‐
ambitious‐new‐climate‐target‐ahead‐of‐un‐summit
Environmental Agency Global Warming Problem Study
Group. (1990). Chikyu ondanka o fusegu [Preventing
global warming]. Nippon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai.
Ferguson, P. (2019). Discourses of resilience in the cli‐
mate security debate. Global Environmental Politics,
19(2), 104–126.
Fetzek, S., Fleishman, R., & Conger, J. (2019). Japanese
industry in an unstable climate: Reducing exposure
to the security implications of climate change (Japan
Series Report 1). The Center for the Climate and
Security.
Gartzke, E. (2012). Could climate change precipitate
peace? Journal of Peace Research, 49(1), 177–192.
Gleditsch, N. P. (2012). Whither the weather? Climate
change and conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 49(1),
3–9.




Hasui, S. (2011). Climate security and its implications for
integrating paradigms of development and security.
In S. Iai, S. Takamitsu, & S. Ikkatai (Eds.), Achieving
global sustainability: Policy recommendations (pp.
279–321). United Nations University Press.
Hayes, J., & Knox‐Hayes, J. (2014). Security in climate
change discourse: Analyzing the divergence between
US and EU approaches to policy. Global Environmen‐
tal Politics, 14(2), 82–101.
Hendrix, C. S., & Salehyan, I. (2012). Climate change, rain‐
fall, and social conflict in Africa. Journal of Peace
Research, 49(1), 35–50.
Homer‐Dixon, T. F. (1994). Environmental scarcities and
violent conflict: Evidence from cases. International
Security, 19(1), 5–40.
Homer‐Dixon, T. F. (1999). Environment, scarcity, and vio‐
lence. Princeton University Press.
House of Representatives. (2010a). Teitanso shakai
zukuri suishin kihon hoan [Basic bill of promoting
building a low‐carbon society]. https://www.shugiin.
go.jp/internet/itdb_gian.nsf/html/gian/honbun/
houan/g17405007.htm
House of Representatives. (2010b). Kikohendo taisaku
suishin kihon hoan [Basic bill of the promotion
of climate change countermeasures]. https://www.
shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_gian.nsf/html/gian/
honbun/houan/g17405015.htm
Huliaras, A., & Tzifakis, N. (2007). Contextual approaches
to human security: Canada and Japan in the Balkans.
International Journal, 62(3), 559–576.
Kameyama, Y., & Ono, K. (2021). The development of cli‐
mate security discourse in Japan. Sustainable Science,
16(1), 271–281.
Kanie, N. (2007). Kiko anzenhosho o meguru kokusai
chitsujo Keisei e: Haiporitikkusuka suru kankyo seiji
no shinso [Toward the formation of an international
order on climate security: The truth of highly politi‐
cizing environmental politics]. Gendai Shiso, 35(12),
210–221.
Kano, T. (2013). Kankyo gaiko—kiko hendo kosho to
gurobaru gabanansu [Environmental diplomacy—
Climate change negotiations and global governance].
Shizansha.
Kurusu, K. (2011). Gendankai no “ningen no anzenhosho”
[“Human security” at the current stage]. Interna‐
tional Affairs, 603, 5–14.
McDonald, M. (2013). Discourses of climate security.
Political Geography, 33, 42–51.
Ministry of Defense. (2020). Defense of Japan (Annual
white paper). https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_
paper/index.html
Ministry of Defense. (2021). “Kiko samitto kiko anzen‐
hosho sessyon” Kishi boei daijin supichi genko
[Remarks at climate security session during Lead‐
ers Summit on Climate by minister of defense of
Japan]. https://www.mod.go.jp/j/press/news/2021/
04/23b.pdf
Ministry of ForeignAffairs. (2021). Leaders Summit on Cli‐
mate remarks by H.E. Mr. Suga Yoshihide, Prime Min‐
ister of Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/
100181623.pdf
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 4, Pages 79–90 88
Ministry of the Environment. (2007). Report on climate
security. https://www.env.go.jp/en/earth/cc/CS.pdf
Ministry of the Environment. (2018). Kiko hendo tekio
keikaku [Climate change adaptation plan]. https://
www.env.go.jp/earth/tekiou/tekioukeikaku.pdf
Ministry of the Environment. (2020a). Reiwa 2 nenban
kankyo junkangata shakai seibutsu tayosei hakusho
[Annual report on the environment: The sound
material‐cycle society and biodiversity in Japan
2020]. https://www.env.go.jp/policy/hakusyo/r02/
pdf.html
Ministry of the Environment. (2020b). Kiko hendo eikyo
hyoka hokokusho (sosetsu) [Climate change impact
assessment report (review)]. https://www.env.go.
jp/press/files/jp/115261.pdf
National Security Council. (2013). National security strat‐
egy. http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/documents/
2013/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2013/12/17/NSS.pdf
New Zealand’s Ministry for the Environment. (2021).




New Zealand’s Ministry of Defence. (2018). The cli‐
mate crisis: Defence readiness and responsibili‐
ties. https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/
66cfc96a20/Climate‐Change‐and‐Security‐2018.pdf
O’Loughlin, J., Linke, A. M., & Witmer, F. D. W. (2014).
Effects of temperature and precipitation variabil‐
ity on the risk of violence in sub‐Saharan Africa,
1980–2012. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America, 111(47),
16712–16717.
O’Loughlin, J., Witmer, F. D. W., Linke, A. M., Laing, A.,
Gettelman, A., & Dudhia, J. (2012). Climate variabil‐
ity and conflict risk in East Africa, 1990–2009. Pro‐
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America, 109(45), 18344–18349.
Ochiai, K. (2001). Kankyo anzenhosho—kakusan suru
gainen [Environmental security—Diffusion of the
concept]. In T. Akaneya & K. Ochiai (Eds.), Atarashii
anzenhoshoron no shiza [Perspectives on new secu‐
rity studies] (pp. 150–182). Akishobo.
Ohta, H. (2002). Kankyo mondai o meguru kikikanri to
yobo [Crisis management and prevention for envi‐
ronmental problems]. In H. Kimura (Ed.), Kokusai
kikigaku [International crisis studies] (pp. 324–345).
Sekaishisosha.
Raleigh, C., Hyun, J. C., & Kniveton, D. (2015). The devil
is in the details: An investigation of the relation‐
ships between conflict, food price and climate across
Africa. Global Environmental Change, 32, 187–199.
Security Council and Cabinet. (2010). National defense




Sharifi, A., Simangan, D., & Kaneko, S. (2020). Three
decades of research on climate change and peace:
A bibliometrics analysis. Sustainability Science, 16,
1079–1065. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11625‐020‐
00853‐3
Takeuchi, K. (1998). Chikyu ondanka no seijigaku [Politics
of global warming]. Asahi Shimbunsha.
The House of Councilors Study Group on Foreign Affairs
and Comprehensive Security. (1992). 90 nendai
no nihon no yakuwari—kankyo to anzenhosho no
arikata [The role of Japan in the 1990s—Concept of
environment and security]. House of Councilors First
Special Investigation Office.
The White House. (2021a). Executive order on tackling




The White House. (2021b). Fact sheet: President Biden
sets 2030 greenhouse gas pollution reduction target
aimed at creating good‐paying union jobs and secur‐







UK Ministry of Defence. (2018). Global strategic trends:
The future starts today. https://www.gov.uk/
government/publications/global‐strategic‐trends
UN Development Programme. (1994). Human develop‐
ment report 1994. Oxford University Press.
UN General Assembly. (2006). Sixty‐first session 16th ple‐
nary meeting (A/61/PV.16). https://undocs.org/en/
A/61/PV.16
UN Security Council. (2017). Seventy‐second year
8144th meeting (S/PV.8144). https://www.security
councilreport.org/un‐documents/document/
spv8144.php
US Department of Defense. (2015). National security





US Department of Defense. (2019). Report on effects of
a changing climate to the Department of Defense.
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/29/2002084
200/‐1/‐1/1/CLIMATE‐CHANGE‐REPORT‐2019.PDF
US Department of Defense. (2021). DoD installation





World Commission on Environment and Development.
(1987). Report of the World Commission on Environ‐
ment and Development: Our common future.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 4, Pages 79–90 89
Yamada, T. (1999). Kankyo anzenhosho to kokusai tochi
[Environmental security and international gover‐
nance]. In M. Naya & I. Takeda (Eds.), Shin anzen‐
hosho no kozu [Construct of new security studies] (pp.
115–148). Keisoshobo.
About the Authors
Seiichiro Hasui is a professor at the College of Humanities and Social Sciences and director of the
Global and Local Environment Co‐creation Institute (GLEC), Ibaraki University. He acquired his MA of
International Studies fromMeiji Gakuin University’s Graduate School of International Studies. He com‐
pleted the Doctoral Program without degree in the Graduate School of Social Sciences in University of
Tsukuba. His fields of expertise include international relations, environmental politics, and peace stud‐
ies. His works in climate security studies include Climate Security and Its Implications for Integrating
Paradigms of Development and Security (2011) by UNU Press.
Hiroshi Komatsu is a chief research fellow at the Center for Asian and Pacific Studies, Seikei University.
He earned his MA and PhD from Waseda University’s Graduate School of Social Sciences. He special‐
izes in international relations in East Asia. His primary publications include For and Against Reversion
of Okinawa to Japan (2015), Revisiting Japan’s Security from Okinawa (co‐authored, 2015) and
Multi‐Layered Sub‐Regions and New Regional Architecture in East Asia (co‐authored, 2020).
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 4, Pages 79–90 90
